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1. INTRODUCTION 
The choice of exchange rate regime is a major issue of macroeconomic policy particularly 
in developing countries characterized by “the fear of float”1. For Sub-Saharan African 
countries (SSA, hereafter) countries, many facing economic instability (high inflation and 
output volatility), the trend is towards the formation of single currency areas. In fact, several 
monetary union projects
2
 are planned in Africa with the ultimate objective being the creation 
of a common currency for the whole continent in 2021. These monetary unions aim to 
promote more trade integration and development on the one hand and on the other to promote 
greater economic stability. However, the empirical studies released so far do not provide clear 
and unequivocal results on this subject (see section 2). These developments in Africa may 
largely be influenced by the relative economic stability of the Communauté Financière 
Africaine (African Financial Community, henceforth CFA) zone. 
Indeed, it is argued that CFA zone members benefit from lower inflation and better fiscal 
discipline compared to similar developing countries, particularly other SSA countries. These 
supposed monetary and fiscal stabilities might explain the longevity of the CFA zone (more 
than 60 years of existence) although the latter does not constitute an Optimum Currency Area 
(OCA)
3
. Alternatively, some authors argue that the CFA zone member countries have lower 
economic growth due to the rigidity of their exchange rate regime. Consequently, in this paper 
we evaluate the effectiveness of the benefits of the CFA monetary union in terms of monetary 
and fiscal stability (related to inflation and fiscal deficit) and its membership costs in terms of 
economic growth. This issue is so important that recently, many African leaders highlighted 
the necessity of maintaining the CFA franc system, especially its convertibility guarantee and 
rigid regime. In fact, as a counterpart to the CFA franc guarantee, zone members must deposit 
at least 65 per cent (recently renegotiated to 50 per cent) of their external reserves in special 
accounts held by the French Treasury. In recent years, these accounts have been in surplus 
which has raised questions about whether the CFA franc system should continue (see Agbor, 
                                                          
1
 A free floating exchange rate can increase foreign exchange volatility and cause wider problems in developing 
country economies. These economies tend to have a financial sector characterised as follows: high liability 
dollarization; financial fragility; and/or strong balance sheet effects. When liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currencies while assets are in the local currency, unexpected depreciations of the exchange rate can diminish 
bank and corporate balance sheets and generate domestic financial system instability. For these reasons 
developing countries appear to face greater fear of floating, as they have much smaller variations of the nominal 
exchange rate, yet face greater shocks and interest rate and reserve movements (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
2
 These monetary unions include: the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) in North Africa, COMESA (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) in East and South Africa, ECCAS (Economic Community of Central 
African States) in Central Africa, SADC (Southern African Development Community) in South Africa and 
WAMZ (West African Monetary Zone) in West Africa (Masson and Patillo, 2004). 
3
 The geographic area in which a single currency might create the greatest economic benefit (see Coulibaly and 
Gnimassoun, 2013, for review on the optimality of this area). 
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2012). Moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the benefit, in terms of trade, of 
the CFA pegging to the euro (European Monetary Union single currency) since Europe is no 
more the privileged partner of the CFA zone members. They export more to other developing 
countries (namely, China, India and Brazil) and less to developed countries (especially 
Europe). Thus, it appears that the significant improvement in terms-of-trade engendered by 
the commodity boom of 2003-2009 has resulted in higher trade with developing countries and 
lower with developed while trade with other African states stayed stable. 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of the fixed exchange rate on three key macroeconomic 
variables: inflation, fiscal balance and growth. In particular, we seek to evaluate the 
importance and impact of CFA zone membership by distinguishing between the effects of 
being in monetary union from those which arose from anchoring the CFA franc. Indeed, as 
pointed out by Bleaney and Fielding (2002), the CFA franc zone has a special exchange rate 
regime as it combines two hard peg regimes (monetary union and the pegging of its common 
currency to the French Franc). These regimes are generally expected to affect economic 
performance in the same way, the only difference being that monetary union implies greater 
political commitment and credibility than a peg. Thus, to better estimate the impacts of the 
CFA zone exchange rate regime on its economic performance, requires differentiating the 
effects of the two regimes (Ghosh et al., 2008). To this end, we apply the method used by 
Bleaney and Fielding (2000, 2002) which consists of simultaneously estimating the effects of 
the peg and that of the CFA using dummy variables (see detail in section 3). Therefore, the 
first dummy will capture the overall effects of the peg while the second will provide the 
additional effect of belonging to the CFA monetary union. Unlike Bleaney and Fielding 
(2000, 2002), our analysis is based on a panel framework which allows us to consider the 
joint occurrence of dynamics and unobserved individual heterogeneity. We also use two 
different exchange rate classification methods (the de jure and de facto classifications
4
) 
recently provided by Ilzetzki et al. (2008). Finally, as previously mentioned, our study focuses 
on the SSA countries wich share most of the salient features of the CFA zone countries 
(commodities and oil producers, low or middle-income countries, exposure to external shocks 
and occurrence of political crisis).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review 
of the implications of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes on inflation, fiscal balance and 
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 The de jure regime corresponds to the official exchange rate regime that a country declares to the IMF while 
the de facto regime is the exchange rate policy that a country actually practices. The latter regime classification 
is estimated in the literature by relying on the evolution of some macroeconomic variables such as countries’ 
exchange rates volatilities, their foreign reserves, parallel market rates, etc. 
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growth across SSA countries. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and presents 
model results. Section 4 concludes the paper and draws some policy implications for 
exchange rate regime choice in SSA. 
 
2. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACT ON 
INFLATION, FISCAL BALANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The exchange rate can affect and be influenced by most macroeconomic variables through 
several channels, thereby making it difficult to separate its direct from indirect effects (Ghosh 
et al., 1996). As a consequence, many empirical studies lead to contradictory conclusions as 
Rose (2011) states: it is generous to characterize the empirical performance of existing 
models as “poor”.5 Overall, much of the recent research concludes that exchange rate regimes 
may be insufficient to explain significant differences between countries economic 
performance (see Klein and Shambaugh, 2010 and Rose, 2011). However, in this section, we 
review the relationship between exchange rate regimes and three key macroeconomic 
variables (inflation, fiscal discipline and growth) and compare SSA countries.
6
 From the 
perspective of the development of monetary unions in Africa, the evolution of these variables 
is closely analyzed as an improved performance is necessary for a successful common 
currency (see for instance, Musungaie, 2010 or Wang et al., 2007). In addition, inflation and 
fiscal balance conditions belong to the first order criteria that countries have to meet before 
joining these monetary unions. Consequently, we focus on the potential impact of fixed and 
flexible regimes on the aforementioned variables as intermediate regime effects are highly 
uncertain. 
2.1. Inflation 
A fixed exchange rate regime is generally associated with lower inflation. This is usually 
due to two main factors: a discipline and a credibility effect. On the one hand, countries with 
fixed exchange rates have lower money supply growth to sustainably maintain the parity level 
which is considered as the main goal of monetary policy (Edwards and Savastano, 1999). On 
the other hand, a fixed regime provides greater monetary credibility as it implies that the 
pegged country’s inflation converges towards that of the anchor country. Private operators 
will therefore have the confidence to hold local currency rather than goods (i.e. save rather 
than spend) or foreign currencies reducing the inflationary consequence of money supply 
                                                          
5
 See also Sfia (2007) and Glodstein (2002) for reviews on limits of empirical studies. 
6
 Generally, the literature focuses on inflation, growth, variability and crisis vulnerability leaving aside an 
important variable for monetary unions that is the fiscal balance. As we will see, fiscal discipline is largely 
ignored in the literature even though it is an issue of enormous policy interest according to Rose (2011). 
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growth as argued by Ghosh et al. (1996). Moreover, this regime is a highly visible 
commitment and its collapse is relatively costly, leading governments to apply “sound” 
economic policies. Nevertheless, another strand of the literature suggests that a peg could lead 
to higher inflation through fiscal indiscipline. Tornell and Velasco (2000) arguments are 
discussed further in the next section. Concerning flexible exchange rates, the tacit monetary 
autonomy allows government—to “surprise” the private sector through unexpected 
devaluations and inflation—to reach full employment, finance its deficit or even to reduce the 
burden of debt expressed in local currency. Consequently, the private sector will anticipate 
high inflation and therefore have a high degree of wage indexation creating greater 
inflationary pressure on the economy. Conversely, Tornell and Velasco (2000) maintain that a 
free float leads to greater fiscal discipline and lower inflation as governments must avoid 
flawed policies, which are immediately observed and punished in a flexible exchange rate 
regime. For Quirk (1996), flexible exchange rates can lead to lower inflation if sufficiently 
flexible to permit market-driven appreciations. 
There is an abundant literature studying the impact of exchange rate regimes on inflation 
which suggests that pegging is a means of reducing inflation, especially for developing 
countries. For example, Edwards (1992) finds that pegging successfully led to lower inflation 
in a sample of 52 developing countries during the period 1980-89. Using a large sample of 
developed and developing countries, Ghosh et al. (1996) show that peg lead to lower inflation 
rate and argue that this stems from discipline and credibility effects of this regime. Ghosh et 
al. (2002) have deepened their previous analyses (e.g. Ghosh, 1996) by relying on de jure and 
consensus classification schemes and differentiating countries relative to their income levels. 
They find similar results for middle and low-income countries but no significant effect of the 
peg on inflation for developed countries.
7
 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) also find a 
robust relationship between a long peg (more than 5 years) and lower inflation for non-
industrial countries. Bleaney and Francisco (2007), whose study is exclusively based on non-
industrial countries, and using five classification methods find that a hard peg and, to a lesser 
extent, a soft peg have been associated with lower inflation. As previous authors, Rogoff et al. 
(2004) reach a similar conclusion for developing countries. They maintain afterward that 
countries will benefit considerably from adopting more flexible regimes as they develop 
economically and institutionally. However, relying on their own exchange rate classification 
scheme, Klein and Shambaugh (2010) analyze the experience of 80 industrial and developing 
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 For upper income countries, only one regression out of four displays significant negative effect of the peg on 
inflation. But this effect is due to the discipline effect. 
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countries between 1980-1999 and observe that the reported negative impacts of using a peg 
on inflation from earlier studies are relatively minor. Unlike previously studies, Klein and 
Shambaugh (2010) find that there is no credibility effect of a peg in developing countries 
while both discipline and credibility effects operate in industrial countries. More recently, 
using four exchange rate classification methods, Rose (2011) concludes that “what is perhaps 
more surprising is how weak are the inflationary consequences of exchange rate regimes”.  
Concerning SSA countries, especially CFA zone members, it is widely argued that the latter 
performed better in terms of inflation. In a study of 40 SSA countries exchange rate regimes, 
capital and price controls, Chhibber (1991) finds that pegged countries have registered lower 
inflation. But also shows that the CFA zones better performance is due to the underlying 
monetary and financial arrangements rather than the peg. Other authors have highlighted the 
exceptional performance of CFA zone members in terms of inflation compared to other SSA 
countries (see Honohan, 1990; Devarajan and De Melo, 1991; Eldadawi and Madj, 1996 and 
Klau, 1998). But the latter do not separate the effects of monetary union from those of 
pegging as suggested in Bleaney and Fielding (2000, 2002) and Ghosh et al. (2008). Using a 
sample of 80 developing countries, Bleaney and Fielding (2000) find that a peg reduces 
inflation by 13 percentage points per year. They also show that CFA membership provides 
additional gains in terms of lower inflation (3.9 percentage points). Similarly, Ghosh et al. 
(2008) show that membership in the CAEMC and WAEMU respectively is associated with 8 
and 10 percentage points lower inflation compared to other low and lower-middle income 
countries. However, compared to countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, previous 
differences slightly decline to 6.2 and 9.4 percentage points for CAEMC and WAEMU 
respectively, suggesting potential membership benefits. Bleaney and Fielding (2002) control 
for other determinants’ effects on inflation and find a similar value (8 percentage points) as 
evidence of the potential benefits of CFA membership.  
In this paper, we present some statistics on inflation, money supply growth, fiscal balance 
and GDP per capita growth in SSA, which is divided into 4 groups: (i) the CFA zone; (ii) the 
Rand Monetary Area (RMA), the second monetary area in SSA; (iii) countries officially 
operating a fixed exchange rate regime (PEG IMF) or a de facto classification scheme (PEG 
IRR) and (iv) other SSA countries (see table A in the appendix). During the period 1985-
2009, the average rate of inflation in the CFA zone was two-times lower than that of the RMA 
(4 per cent versus 10 per cent) and four times lower than other SSA countries (18 per cent). 
The CFA zone inflation rate was also three times lower than that of other SSA countries when 
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their currencies were pegged highlighting the exceptional performance of the zone members 
in terms of inflation. The differences between these groups of countries and the CFA zone are 
reflected in the evolution of money supply. Indeed, the growth rate of their money supply is at 
least twice that of the CFA zone. The importance of this variable in determining inflation was 
evident during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. During the 1994-2009 period
8
, the 
growth rate of money supply for other groups of countries has significantly decreased 
resulting in a lower inflation rate as compared to the previous period. However, the 
performance of the zone in terms of inflation remains significantly lower to that of other 
groups. 
2.2. Fiscal discipline 
The impact of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline is relatively ignored in the 
literature (see Ghosh et al., 2002; Klein and Shambaugh, 2010 and Levy-Yeyati, 2011). Rose 
(2011) highlights this omission as a shortcoming in several studies. However, it is generally 
argued that a peg provides greater fiscal discipline (Tornell and Velasco, 2000).
9
 Indeed, 
adopting lax fiscal policies, in this regime, can lead to a depletion of reserves and thereby to a 
costly collapse of the agreement. Tornell and Velasco (2000) have developed a standard inter-
temporal model within which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by maximizing fiscal 
authority—and propose a counterargument to this conventional wisdom. They show that a 
flexible exchange rate can lead to greater fiscal discipline and welfare. They also argue that 
unsustainable fiscal policies are costly in both fixed and flexible regimes, but the difference 
concerns the inter-temporal distribution of these costs. Under a flexible regime, unsound 
policies are immediately noticed—through changes in exchange rate and price levels — and 
therefore penalized. To prevent paying these costs, government must apply sound policies 
implying greater fiscal discipline. Conversely, unsound fiscal policies are revealed much later 
under a fixed exchange rate regime which may result in its costly collapse. This is particularly 
apparent in monetary unions where a country can benefit from having a higher budget deficit 
than other members because of a uniform union-wide interest rate (Masson and Patillo, 
2004).
10
 Edwards and Savastano (1999) adopt a similar stance using historical arguments 
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 With regard to the CFA zone, the analysis of this sub-period is necessary since before 1994, the two monetary 
unions comprising it were only monetary cooperation areas. The crisis that had hit the CFA zone countries 
during this period led to the devaluation of the CFA franc (down 50 percent) and highlighted the need to enhance 
economic cooperation. Thus, the monetary unions became economic and monetary areas. 
9
 With the recent debt crisis in the Euro zone (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), can we still argue that a peg or 
hard peg leads to greater fiscal discipline? Note however that part of these debt problems is due to bank bailout 
and recovery plans adopted by governments to address the 2008-2009 economic crisis. 
10
 This is known in the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) literature as free riding behavior. 
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maintaining that in the past, fixed exchange rates often failed to ensure macroeconomic 
discipline resulting in major devaluations. 
There are very few empirical studies about the exchange rate regime implications for fiscal 
discipline in Africa. Comparing 11 CFA zone members to 17 non-CFA SSA countries 
between 1980-1984, Tornell and Velasco (2000) show that the latter countries applied more 
robust fiscal policies than the former. However, it should be noted that this finding may be 
subject to sample bias since the period of study is very short, and thus cannot be generalized. 
As shown by Yehoue (2006), a comparison between the CFA zone and others in terms of 
fiscal discipline depends on the time dimension of the sample. Calculating unconditional 
averages of fiscal discipline indicators over the period 1965-2004, the author shows that CFA 
zone budget deficits were lower between 1965-1984 and 1995-2004; but higher between 
1985-1994 than in 27 other SSA countries. Wang et al. (2007) also compare these countries’ 
fiscal balances from 1980 to 2005 with almost the same conclusions (see also Musungaie, 
2010).  
In this paper, we compare the fiscal balance of CFA zone members to that of other SSA 
countries depending on their exchange rate regimes. In the long-run (during 1985-2009), the 
average budget deficit to GDP of the CFA zone (-1.87 per cent) was lower than other SSA 
countries (-3.75 per cent), but higher than the RMA’s deficit (-0.62 per cent) and that of 
pegged countries (-0.64 and -0.98 for respectively IRR and IMF classification schemes). Most 
groups of countries have improved their fiscal balance over the 1994-2009 period, with the 
exception of those SSA countries which do not operate a peg regime. In particular, the 
average fiscal balance in the CFA zone has increased by 4.62 percentage points: from a deficit 
of -4.97 during the period 1985-1993, to a deficit of -0.29 per cent of GDP between 1994-
2009. This may be explained by the exceptional performance of the CAEMC area. However, 
although the latter period corresponds to the establishment of multilateral surveillance criteria 
in the CFA zone, the performance of the CAEMC or the whole CFA zone could not be solely 
attributed to zone membership benefits. It could also result from other factors such as a terms-
of-trade improvement. Indeed, with the exception of the Central African Republic, the 
CAEMC countries
11
 as oil producers and exporters have benefited from the commodity boom 
of 2002-2009. 
2.3. Growth 
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 Chad has started to exploit and export its oil in the beginning of the 2000s. 
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The relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth is ambiguous. 
Economic growth depends on several variables
12
 including the real exchange rate which also 
influences many of them. However, the literature provides some general, but unconventional 
arguments. On the one hand, a flexible exchange rate regime allows a country to have an 
independent monetary policy which can be used to cope with internal and external shocks. 
Consequently, it can stabilize output and absorb shocks, such as terms of trade shocks which 
frequently affect developing countries. However, this regime is costly in terms of credibility, 
particularly in the latter countries where institutions and financial systems are too weak to 
ensure independent and credible policies. A weak financial system, i.e. which does not 
provide the necessary guarantees and sophisticated financial instruments to cover risks, could 
indeed hamper the ability to sustain a flexible exchange rate. On the other hand, a fixed 
exchange rate induces some rigidities which may result in price distortions, exchange rate 
misalignments, and thus currency crisis and higher unemployment. Indeed, some authors have 
argued that an exchange rate peg is associated with greater exchange rate misalignments, 
leading in turn to currency crises (through speculative attacks), with adverse effects on growth 
(see Coudert et al., 2011 and Dubas, 2009). Other authors highlight the difficulty of pegged 
countries when they are confronting terms-of-trade shocks leading to lower growth 
performance (see Brada, 2001 and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005). However, a peg can also 
lead to stronger economic growth through its positive impact on investment and trade. First, a 
fixed exchange rate enhances investment contributing to a more stable economic environment 
with lower inflation and interest rates and through access to larger capital markets. Second, an 
exchange rate peg encourages reduced transaction costs due to a flexible exchange rate, and 
thereby fosters trade between countries.
13
 The latter leads to greater business cycle 
synchronization and economic growth (Frankel and Rose, 2002). 
On the whole, most empirical studies do not find strong evidence of exchange rate regime 
effects on growth. This result is not surprising since some authors consider the choice of 
exchange rate regime as a monetary policy decision which does not affect real variables such 
as long-run economic growth (see Bailliu et al., 2001; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; 
Rose, 2011). For Bailliu et al. (2001), the exchange rate regime could however influence the 
adjustment process of real variables to their long-run levels. Studying the experience of 25 
emerging countries over the period 1973-1998 and using two regime classification schemes, 
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 See for instance, Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Durlauf et al. (2005) who have studied the relevance of 60 and 140 
potential growth determinants, respectively. 
13
 Thus, it is argued that small and more opened countries benefit to peg their currencies to that of their main 
trading partner(s). 
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the authors conclude that flexible regimes lead to higher growth when capital market is 
relatively opened or, to a lesser extent, when domestic financial market is developed. Bailliu 
et al. (2003) show that a solid monetary policy framework is more important than the type of 
regimes themselves. Ghosh et al. (1996) abound in the same sense by maintaining that 
exchange rate regimes do not influence growth performance. Indeed, they show that a peg is 
associated with higher levels of investment and trade than a floating exchange rate, while the 
latter leads to greater productivity growth. They also note that a peg involves more volatile 
output and employment. As for inflation, Ghosh et al. (2002) provide more detailed results 
depending on income levels and regime classification schemes resulting in findings ranging in 
all directions for both output growth and its volatility. Mitigated results have also been found 
by Klein and Shambaugh (2010) for a set of 92 developed and developing countries over 20 
years (1980-1999). They show that fixed exchange rates lead to lower growth compared to 
flexible and flip
14
 regimes namely for non-industrial countries. But these findings are not 
robust to the inclusion of other growth determinants highlighting the relevant role of the latter. 
Unlike, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) find clear evidence of regimes’ impacts, 
namely of the peg, on growth for developing countries only as well as Bleaney and Francisco 
(2007). In fact, they show that both long and short pegs are negatively related to per capita 
output growth in non-industrial economies. These findings are later corroborated by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) who exclusively focused on output growth and volatility. To 
summarize, Rogoff et al. (2004) argue that rigid exchange rate regimes (peg and intermediate 
arrangements) have helped developing countries, to achieve lower inflation with little 
apparent costs in terms of lost growth. In addition, they show that rigid exchange rate regimes 
lead to higher output growth volatility and greater currency crises. Finally, as Rose (2011) 
notes the main differences between the reviewed findings are probably linked to the 
methodologies used to evaluate the potential growth effects resulting from varied exchange 
rate regimes. 
For SSA it is often argued that the CFA zone’s growth performance is worse than for other 
countries. Estimating growth averages (unconditional) for 29 SSA countries between 1981 
and 1992, Ghura and Hadjimichael (1996) show that the CFA zone income declines (-0.91 per 
cent) during this period while the remaining countries stagnated (0.01 per cent output per 
capita growth). Thereafter, they confirm their results by controlling for other determinants of 
growth and conclude that price stability in the CFA zone did not generate higher economic 
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 A country is considered as operating in flip regime when it abandons its peg a time before adopting it after. 
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growth. Hoffmaister et al. (1998) studied the importance of domestic and external shocks in 8 
CFA zone countries compared to 15 other SSA economies. The authors show that the growth 
performance of the CFA zone was better during the period 1975-1985 due to positive terms-
of-trade shocks, but the trend was largely reversed between 1985 and 1993. The relative 
stagnation during the latter period is attributed to CFA franc overvaluation generated by 
appreciation of the French Franc (see also Klau, 1998). Hoffmaister et al. (1998) also 
highlight the greater importance of external shocks in the CFA zone due to its exchange rate 
regime. These different arguments and counterarguments were usefully reviewed by Elbadawi 
and Madj (1996). The latter maintain that the marginal effect of zone participation on growth 
was negative in the short-run (comparing the periods 1986-1989 to 1982-1985) and positive 
but not significant in the long-run (1980s vs. the 1970s). However, Devarajan and Melo 
(1991) find contradictory results which corroborate their earlier findings in Devarajan and 
Melo (1987). Indeed, comparing 11 CFA zone members to 20 other SSA countries over the 
periods (1973-1981 and 1982-1989), they show that growth rate in the CFA zone was better. 
But, they also highlight that the zone members registered lower growth rates compared to low 
income countries and primary or oil exporters. Besides this literature, other studies attempt to 
analyze the effects of real exchange rate volatility and misalignment on growth. Generally, 
they have shown that higher exchange rate misalignment—associated with fixed regimes15—
lead to lower economic growth (see Ghura and Greenes, 1993; Klau, 1998; Elbadawi et al., 
2012). However, most of these studies also found that higher real exchange rate volatility—
associated with flexible regimes—lessens the growth performance. 
As the literature suggests, there does not appear to be an unequivocally clear link between 
an exchange rate regime and GDP per capita growth. Table A in the appendix shows that the 
CFA zone countries growth rate was not significantly different to that of the RMA members 
or other SSA countries operating a different regime. Alternatively, countries seem to have 
experienced higher growth when they peg their exchange rates. Considering the period 1985-
1994, we reach a similar conclusion to Ghura and Hadjimichael (1996) with a CFA zone in 
recession and other SSA countries stagnating. However, the CFA zone has achieved a better 
growth performance following devaluation with an increase of 3.4 percentage points on 
average relative to the previous period. The other groups have also improved their growth 
performance unlike countries which really operate a fixed exchange rate regime. Otherwise, 
the RMA had the most stable growth rate with the lowest standard error of the GDP per capita 
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 See Dubas (2009) and Holtemöller and Mallick (2012) or also Coudert et al. (2011) for evidence on CFA 
zone. 
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growth, following by the remaining SSA countries when their currencies were pegged. In 
contrast, the CFA zone had, the highest growth volatility, especially the CAEMC. 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Our empirical study is based on a sample of 35 SSA countries
16
 over the period 1985-2009. 
The database (variables used, their definitions and sources; and countries retained) is detailed 
in Appendix Table B. As previously mentioned, our aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
benefits or costs of the CFA zone membership which involves differentiating the effects of 
being in monetary union to that of having a fixed exchange rate. Although this counterfactual 
issue is impossible to answer, Bleaney and Fielding (2000, 2002) and Ghosh et al. (2008) 
provided some attempts. The overall idea is to control one regime (monetary union or peg) 
and to evaluate the additional specific gains or losses of belonging to the CFA zone. Bleaney 
and Fielding (2000, 2002) suggested estimating simultaneously the effect of peg and that of 
CFA zone membership using dummy variables while controlling the effect of other potential 
determinants of variables of interest. Ghosh et al. (2008) proposed to choose as control group 
countries that operate a fixed exchange rate regime. Thus, the remaining differences in 
economic performance would highlight the real costs or benefits of the monetary union. To 
distinguish the effects of the two regimes of the CFA zone, one could also compare the zone 
members with other countries that are in monetary unions. Therefore, any observed difference 
could be attributed to the pegging of the CFA franc to an external currency. 
In this study, we use the approach proposed by Bleaney and Fielding (2000, 2002) and two 
different exchange rate classification methods in a panel data framework. In our sample, 29 
countries have declared—at least once over the period of study—that they were in a hard peg 
regime (IMF classification) while only 21 actually operated such a regime (IRR classification) 
including 13 CFA zone members. However, since the dummy representing the CFA zone 
members is time-invariant variable, its coefficient cannot be directly estimated in traditional 
fixed effects panel model. To tackle this issue, we rely on the Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) as suggested in Wooldridge (2002). However, since the endogenous 
variables in the equations of growth and inflation are likely to depend on their lagged values, 
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 Given its similarities with the CFA zone members, the other SSA countries are the most relevant group of 
control for the CFA zone (Elbadawi and Madj, 1996). However, a sample of low-income countries would be 
used as group of control. To be sure that the choice between these two groups of control do not significantly 
affect our findings, we re-estimate the inflation equation of Ghosh et al. (2008) who compare the WAEMU and 
the CAEMC areas to low income countries. Our results are slightly higher than those of these authors (with 8 
percentage point gains for both WAEMU and CAEMC areas) and are available upon request. 
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one could expect to have a dynamic panel models. In this case, the coefficients of the peg and 
CFA dummies are estimated in two steps. Firstly, we use the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate 
the dynamic equations with other potential determinants. This allows controlling the effects of 
the latter, that of persistence (lagged value) and countries specific effects.
17
 In the second step, 
we evaluate the residual effects of the peg and that of the CFA membership. The basic models 
and estimation results are presented in the next subsections. 
3.1. Inflationary benefit of the CFA membership 
The starting point of most studies analyzing inflation is a standard money demand equation 
which—derived from the Fisher identity—considers inflation as a monetary phenomenon and 
suggests that it depends positively on the growth rate of money supply ( 2M ); the nominal 
interest rate (I); the velocity of money (V) and negatively on real GDP growth (Growth). As 
Ghosh et al. (2008) we added to the Fisher identity the following control variables generally 
used in the literature (see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001 and Klein and Shambaugh, 
2010): (i) trade openness; (ii) government balance; (iii) terms of trade variation; (iv) money 
demand (M2 to GDP); and (v) lagged inflation to control for the potential effect of anticipated 
inflation and thus of past policies on the current situation.
18
 Beyond econometric aspects, the 
lagged value of inflation should be accounted for as inflation tends to be persistent (Bleaney 
and Francisco, 2005). However, this effect is not taken into account in many studies as Ghosh 
et al. (2002, 2008) and Klein and Shambaugh (2010). The estimated equation is specified as 
follows: 
itiitjCp
e
itit CVCFAPEG         (1) 
With eit , expected inflation is approximated by lagged inflation; PEG, a dummy variable 
corresponding to 1 when a country has a fixed exchange rate and 0 elsewhere; CFA, a dummy 
variable representing the members of this area; CV, the control variables cited above; i , the 
country effects and it  the disturbance term.  
In short-run, ceteris paribus, the benefits of the CFA zone are denoted ( p + c ) and that of 
the peg equal to ( p ). In long-run, the coefficient ( ) is added to the latter values in absolute 
terms. Tables 1 and 2 below summarize the results for respectively IMF de jure and IRR de 
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 Note that for the money demand equation, countries’ effects could also tackle the issue concerning the fact that 
low inflationary countries tend to operate a peg exchange rate policy i.e. the endogenous phenomena (Klein and 
Shambaugh, 2010). 
18
 Due to the data limitation, the nominal interest rate has not taken into account. 
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facto classification schemes over the periods 1985-2009 and 1994-2009. In the two cases, 
various significant variables have the expected signs except the trade openness which has 
positive effects on the inflation rate. Indeed, following Romer (1993), the literature suggests 
that the more a country is opened, the less are the advantages of unexpected inflation. Thus, 
greater openness should lead to lower inflation. However, empirical evidence of this 
assumption is mixed (see Alfaro, 2005; Klein and Shambaugh, 2010). Regression results also 
highlight the significant impact of previous inflation on current rates. This suggests that a peg 
will usually lead to lower inflation in the long-run (from 0.46 to 0.77 percentage point). Other 
control variables as money growth, money demand and, to a lesser extent, terms of trade, 
trade openness and economic growth have significant and expected impacts on inflation in 
SSA.     
Table 1: Estimation of money demand equation (IMF de jure classification) 
 1985-2009  1994-2009 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
1it  0.7682*** 0.6898*** 0.5144***  0.5759*** 0.6802*** 0.4621*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.07)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) 
PEG -0.0151** -0.0048 0.0065  -0.0192* -0.0192** 0.0078 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CFA   -0.0372***    -0.0426*** 
   (0.01)    (0.01) 
∆M2  0.2168*** 0.2939***   0.2539*** 0.2386*** 
  (0.08) (0.10)   (0.06) (0.05) 
M2 to GDP  -0.0453 -0.1390***   -0.0565** -0.0764*** 
  (0.04) (0.05)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Growth 0.1506 0.0666 -0.8080***  -0.0591 -0.0793 -0.4239 
 (0.53) (0.46) (0.30)  (0.35) (0.33) (0.28) 
Open 0.0116 0.0106 0.0458**  0.0189 0.0138 0.0282* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆Tot -0.1050 -0.1416** -0.1306**  -0.0502 -0.1134*** -0.0823* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Fiscal balance -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0005  -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.0159 0.0027 0.0457***  0.0385*** 0.0260* 0.0322** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Observations 724 720 796  506 502 548 
Nb of country 35 35 35  35 35 35 
Hansen 0.72 0.82 0.91  0.56 0.62 0.61 
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AR1 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2 0.13 0.12 0.10  0.12 0.80 0.15 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Based on the IMF classification scheme, our results show that countries have experienced 
1.5-1.9 percentage points per year lower inflation under a peg than other regimes (columns 1 
and 4). This difference is due to lower money growth (discipline effect) for the period 1985-
2009. Alternatively, accounting for money growth does not affect the coefficient of the peg 
during the period 1994-2009.
19
 As previously noted, the aim is to evaluate the benefits of 
CFA zone membership. Consequently, after controlling for country specificities, inflation 
anticipations and monetary discipline effects, we show that inflation of the CFA zone has 
been around 4 percentage points lower than that of other SSA countries even relative to those 
in fixed exchange rate regimes (columns 1 and 4).     
Table 2: Estimation of money demand equation (IRR de facto classification) 
 1985-2009  1994-2009 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
1it  0.7481*** 0.6704*** 0.5144***  0.5614*** 0.6652*** 0.4621*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) 
PEG -0.0251*** -0.0172** -0.0096  -0.0193** -0.0161** 0.0058 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
CFA   -0.0240    -0.0413*** 
   (0.02)    (0.02) 
∆M2  0.2121*** 0.2939***   0.2393*** 0.2386*** 
  (0.08) (0.10)   (0.05) (0.05) 
M2 to GDP  -0.0728** -0.1390***   -0.0590* -0.0764*** 
  (0.03) (0.05)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Growth -0.0445 -0.1163 -0.8080***  -0.0413 -0.0545 -0.4239 
 (0.48) (0.44) (0.30)  (0.37) (0.35) (0.28) 
Open 0.0215 0.0224 0.0458**  0.0205 0.0154 0.0282* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆Tot -0.0946 -0.1304* -0.1306**  -0.0492 -0.1039** -0.0823* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Fiscal balance -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.0225 0.0170 0.0457***  0.0357*** 0.0232 0.0322** 
                                                          
19
 This result is probably due to the fact that there is no high inflation episode (more than 50%)—thus no 
outliers’ effects—over the period 1994-2009, unlike to the period before. 
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 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
        
Observations 749 745 796  527 523 548 
Nb of country 35 35 35  35 35 35 
Hansen 0.72 0.84 0.91  0.61 0.68 0.61 
AR1 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2 0.12 0.11 0.10  0.11 0.81 0.14 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
If we consider the IRR classification scheme, the findings are much clearer. They show that 
a peg has been associated with lower inflation (2.5-1.9 percentage points per year) and that 
part of this benefit arises from the discipline effect. Indeed, lower money growth has 
contributed to around 30 percent and 16 percent of the benefit in terms of inflation of the peg 
in SSA (see columns 2 and 4 respectively). For the CFA zone, its membership benefit is 
estimated at 4.1 percentage points as previously with the IMF classification scheme. Overall, 
our estimates show that beyond the discipline and anticipated inflation effects, CFA zone 
membership results in additional benefits in terms of inflation. This result is consistent with 
findings provided by Ghosh et al. (2008). According to them, the institutional structure of the 
monetary unions of the CFA zone (pooling of foreign exchange reserves, convergence 
criteria, etc.) leads to greater credibility and hence to better inflation performances. The 
estimated values are moreover similar to that of Bleaney and Fielding (2000).  
3.2. What effect has CFA membership had on fiscal deficits? 
The theoretical reference model used to evaluate the macroeconomic determinants of a 
fiscal deficit follows Tornell and Velasco (2000). They link the fiscal deficit to real GDP per 
capita growth (CGrowth), terms of trade variation (∆TOT) and external public debt (Debt). 
Increased growth and terms of trade is expected to improve the deficit while that of external 
public debt has a negative effect on the latter. The basic model is described as follows: 
itiitititcpit TOTCGrowthDebtCFAPEGF    31211    (2) 
With itF , the fiscal balance; i , the individual effects and it , the disturbance term. 
In addition to the variables retained in the original model, we also use overseas 
development assistance (ODA) and Kauffman et al. (2010) institutional indicators related to 
political stability and the absence of violence, corruption and government effectiveness.
20
 
However, these indicators were only available during the period 1996-2009, so we do not 
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 Dufrénot and Sakho (2008, pp 43-71) used the same explanatory variables as Tornell and Velasco (2000)—to 
which they added external aids, the share of economic sectors and institutional variables—to analyze the 
WAEMU countries’ tax revenues. 
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consider them in the regression covering the whole period 1985-2009. Consequently, we 
consider three possible specifications: (i) a basic model; (ii) a model which takes into account 
the dynamics of ODA and therefore in some way the “shock absorber” role of France through 
its ODA to the CFA zone often mentioned (see Yehoue, 2006); and (iii) a model including 
institutional indicators and /or differentiating between oil and non-oil exporters.   
The results are summarized in table 3 and 4 for the both classification schemes. The main 
determinants of fiscal balance in SSA have the expected signs and are: external government 
debt, terms of trade growth, oil production indicator, country stability and to a lesser extent 
aid to CFA zone. An increase of terms of trade and greater political stability lead to better 
fiscal balance while greater external public debt reduces it. Concerning oil-exporting 
countries, they tend to have a better fiscal balance (between 5.4 and 5.5 percentage points) 
than non-oil exporters
21
. Moreover, there is some evidence of negative effects of ODA on the 
fiscal balance in the CFA zone. This is a surprising, but also interesting finding which has two 
main explanations. On the one hand, it could confirm the proposition that France increases its 
ODA when the zone members are facing negative shocks associated with a large fiscal deficit 
(see Yehoue, 2006). Thus, when French ODA does not eliminate all the negative effects of 
shocks on deficit, it will be negatively correlated to the latter. On the other hand, this finding 
could imply that the CFA zone governments either increase their spending or decrease tax 
revenue mobilization when they receive more ODA. For the WAEMU, Dufrénot and Sakho 
(2008) highlight a negative effect of ODA on this areas member’s tax revenue. 
Table 3: Estimation of fiscal deficit (IMF de jure classification) 
 1985-2009  1994-2009 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
PEG -0.06 0.05 -0.06  0.58 0.70 0.07 
 (0.68) (0.67) (0.66)  (0.84) (0.83) (0.84) 
CFA 0.40 1.52 0.20  1.32 3.00** 1.31 
 (0.93) (1.17) (1.17)  (1.03) (1.37) (1.50) 
CGrowth 6.30* 4.68 1.96  1.12 0.57 -2.69 
 (3.30) (3.35) (3.35)  (3.73) (3.73) (3.73) 
Debt -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***  -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Tot 6.37*** 6.19*** 5.49***  6.04*** 6.02*** 4.84*** 
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 Usually, government in oil-exporting countries exclusively holds oil export revenues (Arezki and Hasanov, 
2013) 
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 (1.50) (1.50) (1.48)  (1.77) (1.77) (1.75) 
Aid  -0.02 0.01   0.00 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.04)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Aid*CFA  -0.12* -0.07   -0.20** -0.12 
  (0.07) (0.07)   (0.10) (0.10) 
Oil   5.42***    5.44*** 
   (1.14)    (1.30) 
Stability       1.09* 
       (0.57) 
Gov Effectiveness       -1.50 
       (1.18) 
Corruption       0.06 
       (1.15) 
Constant -0.72 -0.71 -0.90  -1.04 -1.23 -1.31 
 (0.74) (0.80) (0.78)  (0.79) (0.84) (0.86) 
        
Observations 684 683 683  497 497 497 
Nb of country 35 35 35  35 35 35 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Turning to the role of peg and the benefit of CFA zone membership, results are mixed 
depending on the exchange rate classification schemes. Results based on the IMF de jure 
classification scheme show that neither the fixed exchange rate nor the CFA zone membership 
has a significant effect on the fiscal deficit. However, regression (5), which accounts for the 
effect of ODA over the recent period, shows that the CFA zone membership has been 
beneficial with a fiscal balance 3 percentage points higher than other SSA countries.  
Table 4 below, shows results based on IRR de facto classification scheme, leads to different 
conclusions concerning the effect of a peg. It shows that countries, when they operate a fixed 
exchange rate regime, experience lower fiscal deficits (from 2 to 3 percentage points) than 
other SSA countries, which contradicts the argument advanced by Tornell and Velasco 
(2000). The estimated benefit is however slightly higher for the period 1994-2009 
highlighting the improvement in terms of fiscal discipline of pegged countries. However, our 
results show overall that the CFA zone membership does not lead to additional benefit as the 
dummy representing the zone is not significant. Consequently, it could be argued that a peg 
leads to greater fiscal discipline unlike a monetary union suggesting the possibility of a free 
riding phenomenon in this latter regime.  
Table 4: Estimation of fiscal deficit (IRR de facto classification) 
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 1985-2009  1994-2009 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
PEG 1.96 1.98* 2.32**  2.58** 2.54** 2.81** 
 (1.20) (1.16) (1.11)  (1.30) (1.27) (1.26) 
CFA -1.44 -0.18 -1.90  -0.65 1.14 -1.13 
 (1.34) (1.50) (1.48)  (1.42) (1.69) (1.79) 
CGrowth 6.74** 5.00 2.36  1.45 0.85 -2.20 
 (3.20) (3.26) (3.25)  (3.64) (3.64) (3.62) 
Debt -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03***  -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Tot 6.35*** 6.18*** 5.53***  5.94*** 5.94*** 4.86*** 
 (1.44) (1.45) (1.43)  (1.69) (1.69) (1.67) 
Aid  -0.02 0.01   0.00 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.04)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Aid*CFA  -0.13* -0.07   -0.19** -0.12 
  (0.07) (0.07)   (0.10) (0.10) 
Oil   5.44***    5.53*** 
   (1.13)    (1.28) 
Stability       1.10** 
       (0.55) 
Gov Effectiveness       -1.17 
       (1.14) 
Corruption       -0.20 
       (1.13) 
Constant -1.16* -1.14 -1.43**  -1.26* -1.39* -1.80** 
 (0.70) (0.75) (0.72)  (0.73) (0.79) (0.79) 
        
Observations 709 708 708  518 518 518 
Nb of country 35 35 35  35 35 35 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
3.2. CFA membership, peg and economic growth 
There are several variables which can influence a country’s growth performance: from real 
to nominal variables through to institutional or external determinants (see for instance Sala-i-
Martin, 1997 or Tsangarides, 2005). As our study focuses on the exchange rate regime 
implications, we only control for the effect of relevant determinants of economic growth. 
Thus, we consider the following explanatory variables: investment to GDP; inflation; terms-
of-trade growth; fiscal balance or government spending; debt service and trade openness. 
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Moreover, to control for the potential effects of initial income—referring to the real 
convergence phenomenon of the growth theories—one could use the lagged value of the real 
per capita GDP ( 1itY ). In fact it has been widely argued that high income countries tend to 
have a lower growth rate than low income countries, so the latter will converge towards the 
former. Thus, the expected sign of the initial income is negative. Using the Limited 
Information version of the Bayesian Model Averaging (LIBMA), Tsangarides (2005) tested 
several potential determinants of growth for African states and showed that these variables are 
robustly correlated with their growth rates. The equation to be estimated could be summarized 
as follows: 
itiitjitcpit CVYCFAPEGY   1 ,  with j ≥2   (3) 
With itY , the logarithm of the real GDP per capita;  , the first difference operator; CV, the 
control variables cited above; i , the country effects and it , the disturbance term. 
The estimation results are summarized in tables 5 below for both classification schemes. 
They show that investment and government intervention play a key in SSA countries growth. 
To a lesser extent, the economic growth of these countries is also linked to their terms-of-
trade movements and debt service. Findings also show some evidence of significant 
convergence process between these countries.
22
 
Table 5: Growth equation estimation for both classification schemes 
 IMF de jure Classification  IRR de facto Classification 
VARIABLES (1) (3) (2)
a
 (4)
a
  (5) (6) (7)
a
 (8)
a
 
          
1itY  
-0.0142** -0.0195 -0.0145* -0.0080  -0.0234 -0.0195 -0.0265 -0.0080 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
PEG -0.0106 -0.0099 -0.0037 -0.0072  0.0208 -0.0233** 0.0336 -0.0077 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
CFA - 0.0186*** - 0.0023  - 0.0349*** - 0.0055 
 - (0.01) - (0.01)  - (0.01) - (0.01) 
Investment 0.0281*** 0.0196** 0.0345** 0.0339***  0.0244*** 0.0196** 0.0295** 0.0339*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Deficit 0.0011*** 0.0010** 0.0011*** 0.0011***  0.0010*** 0.0010** 0.0010** 0.0011*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
∆Tot 0.0279** 0.0262* 0.0117 0.0128  0.0258* 0.0262* 0.0081 0.0128 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Debt service -0.0018 -0.0023* -0.0030*** -0.0035***  -0.0015 -0.0023* -0.0029** -0.0035*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Oil 0.0299 0.0767 0.0408 0.0427  0.0378 0.0767 0.0501 0.0427 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.1077 0.1788 0.0912 0.0165  0.2013 0.1788 0.2200 0.0165 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09)  (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.09) 
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 The inclusion of institutional variables in the regressions over the 1994-2009 period does not significantly 
influence our findings. This is why we do not report them here but they are available upon request.   
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Observations 706 786 496 542  731 786 517 542 
Nb of country 35 35 35 35  35 35 35 35 
Hansen 0.78 0.76 0.57 0.62  0.80 0.76 0.69 0.62 
AR1 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.04  0.03 0.01 0.07 0.04 
AR2 0.34 0.23 0.29 0.26  0.30 0.23 0.25 0.26 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
a)
 For regression over the period 1994-2009. 
We find that the impact of a peg is ambiguous and mostly not significant for both 
classification schemes used and periods of study considered. Only regression (6), based on 
IRR classification scheme and over the whole period, shows a significant and negative 
relationship between the fixed exchange rate regime and the per capita economic growth. 
Alternatively, the results concerning the CFA membership effects are quite clearer. Over the 
whole period, findings show that the growth rate of the CFA zone members has been 1 and 2 
percentage points greater than countries in fixed regime (see respectively, regressions 6 and 
3). However, over the period 1994-2009, the rigid exchange rate regime of the CFA zone has 
not significantly affected its economic growth. Consequently, one could conclude that the 
belonging to the CFA zone was beneficial in long-run unlike recent years where many SSA 
countries applied sound policies relative to the 1980s and the first half of 1990s. 
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In recent years, there have been growing debates about whether the CFA franc impedes the 
economic development of the area. This paper aims to participate in this debate by examining 
the extent to which the CFA zone’s economic performance is due to its exchange rate regime. 
We have also reviewed much of the theoretical and empirical literature in this field. We find 
that the literature does not assert a direct and consistent link between a country’s exchange 
rate regime and three key macroeconomic variables (inflation, fiscal balance and growth), in 
general, and are interested in the case of SSA countries. We have compared the economic 
performance of the CFA zone with other SSA countries including the RMA, the second 
monetary area on the continent. This study goes further than previous studies by taking into 
account specific features of the CFA franc agreement, which may influence its economic 
performance. Thus, it both deepens and widens the analysis of the growth-exchange rate 
nexus, and the role of inflation, fiscal balance and monetary union. 
Our findings show that anticipated inflation and rigorous monetary policy have played key 
role in the determination of inflation in SSA countries. In long-run, fixed exchange rate will 
bring down the inflation rate reducing the anticipated inflation. In short-run, the inflationary 
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benefits of the peg have been estimated between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points relative to 
other SSA countries. But significant part of these benefits is linked to lower money growth. 
Controlling for all these factors influencing the inflation rate, our results show that the CFA 
zone members have experienced around 4 percentage points lower inflation than other SSA 
states, even those in fixed exchange rate regimes. They also highlight a greater performance 
(between 1 and 2 percentage points) in terms of economic growth of the CFA zone compared 
to other SSA countries over the period 1985-2009. However, this result was not confirmed 
during the period 1994-2009. The effect of anchoring on the growth is also ambiguous 
according to both classification schemes used. With these mixed findings, one could conclude 
that the rigid exchange rate regime of the CFA zone does not hamper its growth in contrast to 
the expectations. Finally, we find that the CFA zone membership does not have overall 
significant effects on the fiscal balance. But the effects of peg on the latter depend on the used 
classification method. Indeed, when a country really operate a fixed exchange rate regime, it 
benefit from better fiscal balance. Thus, according to the de facto classification scheme, one 
could conclude that peg lead to greater fiscal balance unlike monetary union highlighting a 
possible free rider behavior in the latter. Alternatively, the fiscal balance of countries which 
have declared that they have a fixed exchange rate regime is not significantly different to that 
of others. The analysis also highlights the important role of ODA in the CFA zone, changes in 
the terms-of-trade and a country’s economic characteristics on the fiscal deficit. 
From the perspective of establishing monetary unions in Africa, our results have three 
implications. Firstly, they suggest that a complete monetary union such as the CFA zone will 
probably lead to lower inflation without any significantly negative effect on economic growth. 
Secondly, since pegging regimes seem to exert negative effects on growth, a monetary union 
without being anchored to an external currency (or with a more flexible exchange rate regime 
than the CFA zone as a whole) might be a better option. Finally, African countries committed 
to the establishment of a monetary union must be vigilant about possible free riding behavior 
in such regime by establishing clear and realistic criteria whose violation will be penalized by 
other countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Economic performance of SSA countries over the 1985-2009 period 
Periods 
Areas Average 85-09  Average 85-09 
(1) 
 Average 94-09 
(2) 
 Increase (+) 
/Decrease (-) 
(2)-(1) 
Inflation 
CFA 3.79 (8.97)  0.87 (9.56)  5.43 (8.20)  4.56 (-1.36) 
PEG IMF 13.67 (14.40)  16.89 (17.00)  10.49 (10.43)  -6.40 (-6.57) 
PEG IRR 12.39 (12.18)  13.42 (3.78)  11.95 (14.37)  -1.47 (10.59) 
RMA 9.84 (4.31)  14.02 (3.45)  7.48 (2.62)  -6.54 (-0.83) 
Other SSA 17.44 (25.07)  29.26 (38.79)  12.07 (11.96)  -17.19 (-26.83) 
Money Growth 
CFA 7.91 (16.18)  -0.95 (14.26)  12.35 (15.27)  13.3 (1.01) 
PEG IMF 16.56 (18.57)  16.48 (22.06)  16.62 (15.18)  0.14 (-6.88) 
PEG IRR 15.43 (9.80)  15.68 (7.86)  15.34 (10.48)  -0.34 (2.62) 
RMA 13.20 (7.02)  14.29 (7.21)  12.65 (6.93)  -1.64 (-0.28) 
Other SSA 20.03 (15.34)  24.89 (28.71)  18.07 (13.30)  -6.82 (-15.41) 
Fiscal Balance 
CFA -1.87 (7.16)  -4.97 (5.13)  -0.29 (7.54)  4.62 (2.41) 
PEG IMF -0.98 (6.71)  -1.71 (6.98)  -0.31 (6.42)  1.40 (-0.56) 
PEG IRR -0.64 (5.48)  -1.39 (5.88)  -0.28 (5.30)  1.11 (-0.58) 
RMA -0.62 (5.34)  -2.06 (5.67)  0.19 (5.02)  2.25 (-0.65) 
Other SSA -3.75 (5.58)  -3.88 (5.80)  -3.69 (5.50)  0.19 (-0.30) 
GDP per capita growth 
CFA 1.44 (10.15)  -0.82 (6.03)  2.58 (11.52)  3.40 (5.49) 
PEG IMF 2.32 (4.16)  2.16 (4.64)  2.46 (3.74)  0.30 (-0.90) 
PEG IRR 3.13 (3.63)  3.29 (3.61)  3.07 (3.67)  -0.22 (0.06) 
RMA 1.96 (2.93)  1.85 (4.12)  2.02 (2.15)  0.17 (-1.97) 
Other SSA 1.42 (5.44)  9.7x10
-05
 (5.28)  2.00 (5.41)  2.00 (0.13) 
Notes: 
a) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
b) PEG IMF= PEG according to the IMF de jure classification scheme, CFA zone members being 
excluded. 
c) PEG IRR= PEG following the de facto classification scheme of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008), CFA zone members being excluded. 
 
24 
 
Table B: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
Inflation The annual growth rate of the consumer price index. World Economic Outlook 
2012 (IMF) 
Deficit The ratio of government fiscal balance to GDP World Economic Outlook 
2012 (IMF) 
Growth  The annual growth rate of the real GDP World Economic Outlook 
2012 (IMF). 
Investment The ratio of total current investment to current GDP World Economic Outlook 
2012 (IMF) 
Oil A dummy variable corresponding to 1 if the oil balance of 
the country is higher than 10% and 0 otherwise. The oil 
balance corresponds to oil exports minus oil imports as a 
percent of GDP.  
World Economic Outlook 
2012 (IMF) 
TOT The percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to 
the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the 
base year 2005. 
World Development 
Indicators (World bank) 
Open Sum of imports and exports as a percent of GDP World Development 
Indicators (World bank) 
 
Debt Public long-term external debt UNTAD, UntadSTAT 
Aid to GDP Net official development assistance and official aid 
received as a percent of GDP 
UNTAD, UntadSTAT 
Governance 
Indicators 
Political stability and Violence, Government 
effectiveness, Control of corruption, Regulatory quality 
and Voice and Accountability 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
Countries retained in our study are: 
Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Congo; Equatorial Guinea and Gabon for the CAEMC. 
Benin; Burkina Faso; Côte d’Ivoire; Mali; Niger; Senegal and Togo for the WAEMU. 
Lesotho; South Africa and Swaziland for the RMA. 
Botswana; Burundi; Cape Verde; Ethiopia; Gambia; Ghana; Kenya; Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritania; 
Mauritius; Mozambique; Nigeria; Rwanda; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Tanzania; Uganda and Zambia 
for other SSA.  
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